Whistleblowing
Ronald F. Duska
Is a practice in which employees who know that their company is engaged in activities that (a) cause unnecessary harm, (b) are in violation of human rights, (c) are illegal, (d) run counter to the defined purpose of the institution, or (e) are otherwise immoral, inform the public or some governmental agency of those activities. The ethical problem is whether and under what conditions whistleblowing is acceptable behavior and/or morally required behavior. Whistleblowing, if required, would involve a conflict between the obligation of loyalty the individual is presumed to have to the company and the obligation to prevent harm the individual is presumed to have to the public. But the exact nature and demands of these conflicting obligations to the company and the public are disputed.
Most business ethicists claim that employees have some obligation to the company or employer, which is usually characterized as an obligation of loyalty. Whistleblowing violates that obligation. In that context the company is viewed as analogous to a sports team. In sports, whistleblowing is the function of neutral, detached referees who are supposed to detect and penalize illicit behavior of opposing teams. It is neither acceptable nor a responsibility of a player to call a foul on one’s teammates. If the analogy holds, what is unacceptable in sports is also unacceptable in business. From this perspective, whistleblowing is viewed as an act of disloyalty (‘‘finking,’’ ‘‘tattle tale’’) and there is a presumption against it. Consequently, a countervailing obligation to the public would be the only justification for overriding the obligation to the team or company. There is a wide range of views on the issue, ranging from the position that whistleblowing as an act of disloyalty is never justified, to the opposite position that employees owe no loyalty to a company and given their right to freedom of expression they can ethically disclose whatever they wish about a company, except where their work contract expressly or at least implicitly prohibits it.
Most business ethicists writing on whistle blowing maintain a fiduciary obligation of loyalty that whistleblowing violates, so the burden of proof or justification falls to the whistle blower. However, defenders of whistleblowing maintain that in conditions where companies violate ethical and/or legal constraints, whatever obligation of loyalty an employee has is abrogated, and whistleblowing is not only permissible but may also be morally required, on the grounds that individuals have a responsibility to the general public to prevent harm or illegal activity. Hence the conflict of obligations we mentioned. However, it is possible to argue that even if the illegal or immoral behavior of the company abrogates the responsibility of loyalty, there is no consequent good samaritan obligation to the general public to ‘‘blow the whistle.’’
So two arguments are needed: one to show whistleblowing is permissible, a second to show it is required. This latter argument is quite important, since blowing the whistle can lead to harm to the whistleblower. Under what conditions is one required to do what would likely harm oneself ?
The argument for the permissibility of whistleblowing sets down a set of conditions to be met before a whistleblower can justifiably inform on her company.
1 The whistleblowing should be done for the purpose of exposing unnecessary harm, violation of human rights, illegal activity, or conduct counter to the defined purpose of the corporation, and should be done from the appropriate moral motive, that is, not from a desire to get ahead, or out of spite or some such motive. Nevertheless, whether the act of whistleblowing is called for is not deter mined by the motive of the whistleblower but by the company acting either immorally or illegally.
2 The whistleblower should make certain that his or her belief that inappropriate actions are ordered or have occurred is based on evidence that would persuade a reasonable person.
3 The whistleblower should have acted only after a careful analysis of the danger: (a) how serious is the moral violation? (minor moral matters need not be reported); (b) how immediate is the moral violation? (the greater time before the violation occurs the greater chances that internal mechanisms will prevent the anticipated violation); (c) is the moral violation one that can be specified? (general claims about a rapacious company, obscene profits, and actions contrary to public interest simply will not do).
4 Except in special circumstances, the whistle blower should have exhausted all internal channels for dissent before informing the public. The whistleblower’s action should be commensurate with one’s responsibility for avoiding and/or exposing moral violations. If there are personnel in the company whose obligation it is to monitor and respond to immoral and/or illegal activities, it would be their responsibility to address those issues. Thus, the first obligation of the would be whistleblower would be to report the unethical activities to those persons, and only if they do not act, to inform the general public.
5 The whistleblower should have some chance of success. Ought implies can, so if there is no hope in arousing societal or government pressure, then one needlessly exposes oneself and one’s loved ones to hardship for no conceivable moral gain.
But these conditions speak mainly to the permissibility of blowing the whistle. A further, often overlooked question is under what conditions is it morally required (obligatory), if ever, for an employee to blow the whistle. The literature on this subject is sparse, except that there seems to be a good deal of tacit agreement that some sort of good samaritan principle is operative here. Hence, if there is an obligation to prevent harm, under conditions where there is a need and the person is capable of preventing the harm without sacrificing something of com parable moral worth, and if the person is the last resort, then that obligation would operate in the case of whistleblowing. Conditions 4 and 5 may be read as assuming that there is a responsibility to blow the whistle. But to show that obligation requires showing there is an obligation to the general public to prevent harm (Simon, Powers, and Gunneman, 1972).
In the corporate context, the company is seen as a team and expects loyalty. Forsaking the team to function as a detached referee to blow the whistle is seen as disloyal and cause for punitive action. In such a culture, to blow the whistle requires a certain moral heroism. Given the fact that society depends on whistleblowers to protect it from unscrupulous operators, justified whistleblowers need some protection. To assure the existence of necessary whistleblowers (some body’s got to do it), sound legislation is needed to protect the whistleblower.
Finally, whistleblowing is not restricted to the area of business. It occurs in all walks of life. Professionals may be held to the standards of their profession, that sometimes require blowing a whistle. For example, accountants and engineers have a dual obligation to their clients and to the public. Hence, they have a fiduciary responsibility to report certain illegal or potentially harmful activities if they encounter them in the course of their auditing or accounting or con structing. These obligations come from the professional status of the accountants and engineers, just as such obligations extend to all professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, who have obligations to their profession and the public to blow the whistle on colleagues who violate certain canons of appropriate behavior. But beyond the professions, whistleblowing is required in other walks of life: for example, the participants in an honor code have a responsibility to report violations. While such whistleblowing activity is viewed unfavorably, it is a necessary part of human activity.
Enlightened companies, aware that harmful, immoral, or illegal behavior that needs to be reported is likely to occur from time to time, have begun to make provisions for regularizing the monitoring of behavior, with ombudspersons or corporate responsibility officers. Such offices provide an outlet for those who feel obliged to report the unseemly behavior of their companies, without the need to go public. These provisions are desirable because they will alleviate the necessity of going public and blowing the whistle on harmful or illegal behavior.
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