Transforming Justice
Thomas F. McMahon
May be defined as a theory on the interaction between rights and power that makes justice operative. Transforming justice is a conceptualization of justice which seeks to incorporate the vitality of power in the very definition of justice. Although transforming justice does have human rights for its basis, it does not subscribe to the strengths or weaknesses of other theories of just ice (see rights).
How does transforming justice differ conceptually from the more traditional theories of just ice and rights? The fundamental difference rests in the concept that justice cannot, and therefore will not, become an existential reality unless its theory also contains the notion of power. Power is what makes justice ‘‘transforming’’ – for example, moving away from inequality in fact toward equality in deed.
The ‘‘interaction’’ between rights and power in transforming justice challenges the traditional view that rights and power are to be treated as parallel factors in human behavior. It is in the practical order – not necessarily in abstract notions – where rights and power interact to produce transforming justice.
Rights
Rights are claims by one entity for or against another entity, either human or corporate. A right is a relationship; it is not a thing. In a way, a right is a means to an end, such as the equality of justice (see justice). Rights are obtained through some source or title, such as contract. Rights are qualitative and thus ‘‘inform’’ the person, whether human or corporate. Rights are also dichotomous: either a person has them or not. There are no degrees. In this sense, they cannot be measured in terms of more or less.
Justice has rights for its object: by respecting the rights of others, a person gives another what is her/his due. Indeed, the ancient Roman definition of justice states that each person is to give the other what is his/her due. From another perspective, a person, by respecting the rights of another, empowers the other. However, different theories of rights frequently provide various, and sometimes conflicting, sources or titles of rights. In a pluralistic society where many value systems exist in the same geographical and social context, a particular claim of one person or group might not be recognized or acknowledged by others. Thus arises conflicts of rights.
Power
The problem of conflict of rights creates one of the most perplexing problems in determining how transforming justice applies to concrete situations. Power is the capacity to bring about change in others according to the intent of the agent (powerholder). Like rights, power is relational; it always deals with another entity: human, corporate, or systemic. Power is quantitative: it can be measured, usually by its effect or impact. Furthermore, as quantitative, power can be added to or subtracted from, as every politician is aware on election day. Power can also be viewed as interacting. Political power can generate economic or social power; moral power can influence political power.
The source of power, unlike the title of rights, may be less certain. Depending upon the kind of power, it can be obtained through inheritance, contract, force, competition, manipulation, fraud, or a combination of these. However, of itself, power is ethically neutral. The manner of obtaining power and its subsequent use deter mine whether it is an ethical good or an ethical evil.
Justice
Justice will be considered under the form of moral virtue. A moral virtue leads to action. Its value is in the behavior it elicits in the person who possesses it. Although a moral virtue, like every virtue, ‘‘perfects’’ the person who possesses it, it also leads the person to some form of controlled behavior. While the moral virtue of temperance perfects the person in moderation in food and drink, the moral virtue of justice leads to behavior which refers to the rights or claims of some other person apart from the agent. Unlike temperance, justice is not subjectively deter mined by the peculiar limitations of the agent, but is objectively determined by the established rights of the other person. Unlike power, which can be added to or subtracted from, the moral virtue of justice ‘‘qualifies’’ the person in the sense that ‘‘value added’’ is understood in the process of production (see virtue ethics).
As a general rule in transforming justice, rights must precede power in transforming just ice. Or, to put the rule in a negative frame, ethically evil power must not be used to obtain a right: ‘‘might does not make right.’’
In transforming justice, the ‘‘value added’’ is the capacity to move the agent to respect the claims of others or have others respect the agent’s claims. Thus, power becomes a means to the end of justice, which is equality, among other things. Rights become the grist for the mill of transforming justice. Transforming justice, however, uses power to make certain that these rights are respected both by the agent and by the receiver.
Finally, the traditional theories of justice, al though they are directed toward others, have no way of ‘‘moving’’ the agent or the other person to respect rights. For example, racial and sexual discrimination still exist in spite of the civil rights laws pertaining to women and minorities.
This kind of social justice needs to be made operative. With power as an integral part of its concept, transforming justice can only exist in an operating form. Transforming justice is a moral virtue in the fullest sense; it can be that ‘‘value added’’ which modifies by qualifying humans and, consequently, their behavior to recognize or to receive rights. As a practice it leads to new approaches to such issues as racial and sexual discrimination, employee rights, company re organization, terminations, and many other disturbing ethical issues which executives and managers have to face.
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