Teams
Robert A. Phillips
A team refers to a special subclass of cooperative scheme characterized by a particularly high degree of interdependence and close knittedness and often focused on a single goal. While sports examples abound, a good, non athletic example may be a project team within a manufacturing firm. Although the members may all be employees of the same corporation and thus have obligations to that organization and the economy at large as members of these respective cooperative schemes, they are also part of a team with the concomitant increase in ethical content. They spend many hours a day together, they share a common goal, they are more likely to go out of their way to assist teammates, and they depend upon one another more than the organization at large. The concept of a team, on this under standing, indicates a higher level of commitment than many other similar cooperative schemes and therefore will contain a higher level of ethical content.
The necessity of cooperation in value creation and exchange relationships (i.e., virtually all economic interactions) is readily apparent. This need to cooperate leads inexorably to the demand that individual economic entities work as parts of teams. There are many things that can only be done by teams and many others which can be done better by teams than by individuals. Further evidence of the importance of teams can be seen in the preeminent role of building ‘‘team skills’’ in most business schools. One’s ability to work as part of a team is, more often than not, vital to success in the business world.
However, insofar as most issues with high ethical content occur in interpersonal contexts – indeed, some would argue that ethics for a hermit is an empty or meaningless concept – the benefits of cooperative behavior carry with them a great deal of ethical baggage. A good starting point is to ask this question: Does a person have greater obligations to a ‘‘teammate’’ than to society at large? If so, what is the source and nature of this increased obligation?
Philosophical justification for behavior within teams can be found (in addition to its utility for those of consequentialist leanings) in the concept of fairness or fair play (see consequentialism). Alluded to by John Locke (1690) and Adam Smith (1790), and later by H. L. A. Hart (1955), the principle of fairness finds its most sophisticated defense in the work of John Rawls. The ‘‘principle of fairness,’’ combined with certain natural duties, represents the moral rules for individuals in Rawls’s much acclaimed A Theory of Justice (1971). As Rawls puts it in another work:
The principle of fair play may be defined as follows. Suppose there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can only be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates. Suppose further that cooperation requires a certain sacrifice from each person, or at least involves a certain restriction of his liberty. Suppose finally that the benefits produced by cooperation are, up to a certain point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation is unstable in the sense that if any one person knows that all (or nearly all) of the others will continue to do their part, he will still be able to share a gain from the scheme even if he does not do his part. Under these conditions a person who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair play to do his part and not to take advantage of the free benefit by not cooperating. (Rawls, 1964: 9 10)
The principle takes as one of its major concerns the issue of free riders within a cooperative scheme. One of the greatest problems with using teams is that there are often members of a team who fail to do their share. Free riders hope to be carried along by the success and effort of others within the cooperative scheme while themselves contributing far less than their role and the benefits they receive would dictate. The principle of fairness provides a moral foundation for the obligations of individuals within a co operative scheme as well as the obligations of the scheme to the individual in the form of provision of a fair share of the benefits of the scheme.
Although providing solutions to the myriad ethical issues would be rather difficult (if not impossible) in the abstract, it might nonetheless be useful to at least point out some of the possible areas of controversy inasmuch as the recognition of ethical content in a situation may help properly frame the issues. Can the majority (ethically) force their will on the minority or an individual for the sake of the team goal or purpose? Should the individual voluntarily yield to the team for the sake of the goal? Should such a goal or purpose come from within or from out side the team and will the source make a difference in the level of commitment required? What about the assigning of responsibility and ac countability both within teams and for the effect of the team as a whole on the rest of the world? Where is the line between team leadership and coercion? What are the obligations of being a follower? These are just a few of the possible ethical pitfalls to be aware of when thinking about teams, especially in a business context.
Bibliography
Hart, H. L. A. (1955). Are there any natural rights? Philosophical Review, 64, 175 91.
Katzenbach, J. R. and Smith, D. K. (1993). The Wisdom of Teams. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
Locke, J. (1690). Second Treatise of Government, para. 130. Numerous editions are available.
Rawls, J. (1964). Legal obligation and the duty of fair play. In S. Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy. New York: New York University Press, 3 18.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Smith, A. (1790). Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part II, Section II, ch. II. Numerous editions are available.