Racism
Jesse Taylor
A belief that one’s ethnic stock is superior. The term ‘‘racism’’ is an evaluative offspring of the concept ‘‘race.’’ In spite of the parental relationship, however, racism is an independent phenomenon that has flourished in the midst of controversy surrounding ‘‘objectivity’’ with respect to the concept of ‘‘race’’ itself (Zack, 1993). Conceptually, the idea of ‘‘race’’ is concerned merely with metaphysical or biological classifications of people in accordance with at tributes or characteristics considered usually ascribable as group identifying properties. By contrast, racism assigns values and stereo types to those race categories in order to fix race relations along a continuum of ‘‘superior race to inferior race.’’ From this perspective, we understand racism primarily from what it seeks to accomplish as a value thrust, rather than as an action with independently definable properties. In this context, racism is viewed as an ‘‘occasional phenomenon’’ (Gadamer, 1993: 144–59) of actions that are not intrinsically racist. However, the lack of tangible characteristics does not obscure the fact that the display of racism in many practices and attitudes is frequently undeniable (Gault, 1992).
Racist. A member of a racial group considered elite as determined by political, social, economic, etc., powers, and who willfully participates in practices designed to maintain the elite status of the racial group of which one is a member. There is an element of controversy associated with this conception of a racist. It eliminates blacks, for instance, as possible racists. However, since one could not claim social, political, or economic benefits from their black racism, it seems pointless to suppose that such racism exists. It is conceivable that what is considered ‘‘black racism’’ is merely a conditioned response to ‘‘white racism,’’ thus not racism at all.
Epistemology of racism. Our judgments that some actions are racist are open to debate for the same reasons as ‘‘held to be a work of art’’ may be subject to debate over whether or not something is actually art. As in art, disputes concerning racism will be settled with a heavier emphasis on value rather than factual considerations. That is, since racism is not definable as an independent act (Austin, 1956), its being is understood as the outgrowth of judgments about purposes and consequences of actions that are in fact fully definable. There are clear cases of racism that tend to reinforce a ‘‘pecking order’’ among racial groups so as to give privilege to the so called elites. At bottom, we under stand racism as a commitment to that pecking order, or to one’s involvement in practices that help to maintain privileges of those considered racial elites.
Science and racism. It is unlikely that science will ever settle disputes concerning racial superiority. Debates on this issue involve judgments that are immune to sensory input by virtue of their roles in constituting frameworks for judgments. In this respect, racism is viewed as a phenomenon of reflective consciousness. As such, it belongs to the Kantian realm of ‘‘art’’ as opposed to that of ‘‘science.’’ On the other hand, even if racial superiority could be established scientific ally, it may yet be morally wrong to oppress human beings, since inferiority would not change nature’s requirement to function in accordance with the full gamut of their humanity (Williams, 1991).
Equality and racism. Racism is antithetical to prevailing conceptions of equality. Thriving on the idea of race as a ‘‘great making quality,’’ racism views the worth of a person as con strained within the scope of their racial identity. The interest of a race considered superior (generally as defined by those holding political and economic power) will supersede the interests of all others without regard to questions of justice or to impact upon the victims. Such subordination of interests persists in spite of its incompatibility with conceptions of equality advanced by Locke, Kant, Rawls, and other prominent social/political scholars (see kantian ethics). For them, human equality is not to be defined in terms of abilities as such, since they vary from person to person and even with respect to a particular person at different times or circumstances. Equality is concerned with dis positional aspects of humanity that are universal, not with relative manifestations of those dispositions in individuals or in groups. This conception of equality evokes a kind of ‘‘form over function’’ standard for personhood. This standard forbids applying restraints to one’s natural or metaphysical identity based on a notion that some should not be allowed to exist as fully human, since others are considered ‘‘better fit’’ to achieve the same metaphysical task. On this issue, Locke, Kant, and Rawls have clearly taken the position that it is morally impermissible to restrain the natural dispositions of persons to exist as such.
Universality of racism. Slavery and its consciousness have made it impossible to live in America without the residual effect of racism having some influence on how our judgments of others and ourselves are determined. Racism has also become institutionalized to the degree that many of us participate in racist practices without our knowledge (Appiah, 1990). Persons actually viewed as racist, however, are among those privileged to the advantages of the racial elite, and who support the stereotypes that establish a hierarchy among racial groups.
Color and racism. Color alone is not a race problem for persons of color. Blind persons would perhaps choose to be sighted if the means were available to them, but one’s color is not an impediment to one’s human potential. Under Rawls’s ‘‘veil of ignorance,’’ for example, it is perfectly conceivable that as many persons would choose black as a color of preference as those disposed to choose white (among those wishing to express a color preference at all). The idea of color as a cause of racial problems gives rise to the view that color is a qualitative aspect of humanity. Once it is clear that color problems stem from a socially created color criterion, rather than from color itself, it is clear that racism has nothing to do with color as such.
Racism as vice. Although racist sentiments tend to vary with political and economic climates, most people reject racism as an admirable human quality. Just as persons who find them selves ‘‘selfish’’ in undesirable respects can foster a better sense of altruism from practice, persons who are discontented with their racism can participate in practices that can help to reduce their racism considerably. In this sense, we can think of racism as a vice and the absence of it a virtue. So conceived, it is possible to cultivate non racist potential that exists in actual racists, provided that they are unhappy with their racism. There are no assurances that racism will ever be fully eliminated. However, with general agreement that racism and selfishness are not good human qualities, the elimination of both can be espoused as worthy goals.
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