Principle of Moral Projection
Kenneth E. Goodpaster
Is formulated as follows: ‘‘It is appropriate not only to describe organizations (and their characteristics) by analogy with individuals, it is also appropriate normatively to look for and to foster moral attributes in organizations by analogy with those we look for and foster in individuals’’ (Goodpaster, 1983). The intuitive idea is straightforward: to explore the analogy between persons and organizations in order to determine whether and how it might guide descriptive and normative ethical thinking about either.
Critics of the principle of moral projection (Ranken, 1987) have argued that the analogy between persons and organizations is not only imperfect in certain respects, but also dangerous, in that it could have the effect of reducing needed attention to individual responsibility in corporate settings. Defenders reply that affirming corporate responsibility is not inconsistent with affirming individual responsibility as well in situations where both apply.
Put in its simplest terms, the principle of moral projection states that we can and should expect no more and no less of our institutions (taken as moral units) than we expect of ourselves (as individuals). In particular, moral responsibility is an attribute that we should look for and try to foster in individuals. The principle of moral projection, therefore, invites us to explore the analogues of moral responsibility for organizations. ‘‘Corporate responsibility’’ could then be seen as the moral projection of the idea of responsibility in its ordinary (individual) meaning, viz. perception, reasoning, and action rooted in a basic concern for stakeholders (Stone, 1976: 114).
See also moral status of corporations
Bibliography
Goodpaster, K. E. (1983). The concept of corporate responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 2 (1), 1 22. (An earlier formulation appears in Goodpaster and Matthews (1982) Can a corporation have a conscience? Harvard Business Review, January February.)
Ranken, N. (1987). Corporations as persons: Objections to Goodpaster’s ‘‘principle of moral projection.’’ Journal of Business Ethics, 6 (8), 633 7. (Also see Goodpaster (1987), The principle of moral projection: A reply to Professor Ranken. Journal of Business Ethics, 6 (4), 329 32.)
Stone, C. (1976). Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior. New York: Harper and Row.