Brand Equity: The Marketer’s View on Brand Value - The Economy of Brands

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BRAND EQUITY: THE MARKETER’S VIEW ON BRAND VALUE


Jan Lindemann

At the time financial markets started recognizing the value of intangible assets and brands marketing academics in the US, in the early-1990s, also attempted to conceptualize the brand as a business asset. The result was the concept of brand equity which capitalized on a financial term to define a marketing concept. The term was made popular by the publications of David Aaker and Kevin Keller. Aaker described brand equity as a “set of assets (and liabilities) linked to a brand’s name and symbol that adds to (or subtracts from) the value provided by a product or service to a firm and /or that firm’s customers.”1 The main asset categories comprised awareness, loyalty, perceived quality, and other brand specific associations. Despite the use of the term equity, the framework consisted of a combination of market research metrics. Aaker later expanded the framework to include metrics from other models, most notably Y&R’s brand asset evaluator and Interbrand’s brand strength assessment. The resulting measurement framework comprised the following metrics: 
  1. willingness to pay a price premium;
  2. satisfaction/loyalty;
  3. perceived quality;
  4. leadership/popularity;
  5. esteem/respect;
  6. perceived value;
  7. personality;
  8. trust and admiration for the organization;
  9. differentiation;
  10. market share;
  11. price differential; and
  12. distribution depth/coverage.
As the broad set of metrics suggests the framework is more a guidance for the issues and themes to consider than a clear quantitative model. Aaker acknowledged that while all these measures have diagnostic value, management efforts should focus on a minimum of one to a maximum of four relevant metrics. Selecting the relevant metrics requires educated judgment. As the weighting of the factors can be a conceptual as well as statistical challenge in its own right, Aaker suggested that weighting all dimensions equally would be a good default option.2 As a single measure for brand equity Aaker favors the price premium as the most suitable metric. 

Aaker’s brand equity framework is useful as it provides a list of proven and relevant metrics. It also clearly demonstrates the complexity of and difficulty involved in measuring the economic value of brands. However, the model does not address two key elements that are crucial for valuing and managing the economic value of brands. The first element is the relative importance or prioritization of different dimensions. The different dimensions overlap and it is not clear how dependent or independent each dimension is. An understanding of the relative impact and weight of each element is critical for recognizing and managing the value creation of a brand. Second, the framework lacks a clear conceptual link to financial value creation. An economic assessment of a brand is incomplete without a link to financially measurable business results. As such, Aaker’s brand equity framework provides useful insights and concepts for assessing brand value, but on its own it cannot provide an economic assessment of a brand. 

After Aaker, Kevin Keller, a marketing professor from the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, developed a systematic brand equity approach in the form of a pyramid shaped model that has influenced several research models. He also collaborated with some research agencies, most notably with the Nielsen Company, on commercially applied brand equity models which are described later. At the base of the pyramid is the salience of the brand. On the next level, the brand is split into its rational and emotional aspects measured in terms of performance and imagery. Consumer judgments and feelings about the brand occupy the layer above. At the tip of the pyramid is brand resonance measured by loyalty, attachment, community, and engagement. The customers’ relationship with a brand can be measured in terms of their position on the pyramid of engagement and their relative bias towards a rationally dominant or emotionally dominant relationship.3

While Aaker formulated the brand equity manifesto several market research companies have developed models that deliver an integrated brand equity approach based on the relative impact of different brand dimensions. One of the most prominent and longest running approaches has been the brand asset valuator (BAV) developed in 1993 by Young & Rubicam, a major advertising firm.4 The BAV is a brand equity model based on a standardized questionnaire that is used to assess thousands of brands in major markets around the world. As such it is among the largest and most consistent market research survey available. The assessment model is based on a 32-item questionnaire that is analyzed according to four major brand dimensions: differentiation; relevance; esteem; and knowledge. Differentiation measures how distinctive and differentiated a brand is. The more differentiated a brand is, the more it stands out and represents a point of view. Relevance measures how meaningful and important the brand is relative to the respondents’ needs. Esteem measures popularity and perceived quality of the brand. Knowledge measures the understanding respondents have of what the brand stands for. The BAV measures the health of a brand by mapping the research results on a two-dimensional matrix called the “power grid.” 

The X-axis measures brand stature which is calculated by multiplying esteem with knowledge. The Y-axis measures brand strength which is calculated by multiplying differentiation with relevance. The equity of a brand can be assessed according to its position on this power grid. As with most 2×2 matrices the best performers can be found in the quadrant on the upper right. Here lie the healthy and leading brands that score highly on both dimensions. According to the 2006 survey, brands from the consumer electronics category included Sony, LG, I-Pod, Duracell, and Energizer. The bottom left quadrant is made up of newcomers or weak brands that have failed to develop. Here we find Blaupunkt, Loewe, and Technics. In the top left quadrant are the growing or strong niche brands such as Miele, Dyson, and Bang & Olufsen. In the right bottom quadrant is populated by established but tired and declining brands such as Whirlpool, GE, and Toshiba.5 

The brand asset valuator is a unique market research study that provides interesting benchmarks and insights. However, it does not link directly to economic value creation. This may be due to the fact that it was established by Y&R with the intention of assessing communications effectiveness through consumer perceptions. Due to its adoption as an operating unit within Y&R Group, the BAV has been positioned as a marketing consultation product. In that context there have been several attempts to overlay the BAV database with some financial analyses. In 2002, Y&R formed a joint venture with Stern Stewart & Co named BrandEconomics. The venture undertook a study comparing the intangible value of companies where one brand dominated the business (more than 80 percent of revenues) and which were quoted on the stock market with the results from the BAV brand health check. The intangible value was calculated as the stock market value less the tangible book value. BrandEconomics then derived sales multiples by dividing the branded sales with the intangible value. These multiples were compared with the results of the BAV matrix. It should be noted that the study covered the period between 1993 and 2000 when the price to tangible book value of the S&P 500 Index was between 3 and 7. This period was one of the biggest bull markets and it ended with the dotcom bubble burst in March 2000. As a result BrandEconomics’ analysis is based on a rather unrepresentative set of data that limits the use of the analysis and in particular its generalization and application to other periods. 

The study demonstrated that there was a match between the relative health of a brand as measured by the BAV and its value creation. Companies with relatively unknown brands had a relatively low intangible value equal to around 0.9 of their annual revenues. Stronger brands with higher levels of differentiation and relevance had approximately double the intangible value at 1.9 times their annual sales. Brands that have both strength and stature were unsurprisingly the healthiest brands. The intangible value of these companies reached 2.5 times their annual sales. However, companies with high strength but low differentiation showed a significantly lower intangible value of 1.4 times their annual revenues. These companies were “milking” their brands but failed to deliver a relevant and differentiated offer which is reflected in declining price points. BrandEconomics’ research also concluded that, on average, financial factors explained around 55 percent of the market value of companies, brand factors around 25 percent and other factors such as industry context and economic cycle accounting for most of the remaining 20 percent. 

However, the brand impact on stock market value showed a rather broad range between 10 percent and 75 percent suggesting a higher brand influence in consumer goods than B2B and technology driven companies. The research also showed that there was a strong link between differentiation and higher profit margins. Differentiation did not only match higher profit margins but also stronger protection during the recession period of 1999 to 2001. Brands with strong differentiation managed largely to preserve their levels of operating profit.6

The BrandEconomics research revealed that relevance and differentiation are the key drivers of brand and shareholder value. As such it provided further quantitative support for an established marketing mantra. The impact depended on the relative importance of branding in the respective business. The venture between Y&R and Stern Stewart was short-lived and dissolved a year later. Due to the lack of integration between marketing and financial analysis the findings were too broad to assist in brand strategy and detailed brand building efforts. An additional issue was that the intangible valuations were performed during a strong bull market run resulting in high price to tangible book value. This limits the application of the specific figures to other periods where the price to book ratios were significantly lower. In 2009 the price to tangible book value of the S&P 500 dropped to 2.7. Interestingly, the BAV team used the stock market decline to put an alternative spin on their database. The bull run that provided the data to support the link between the findings of the BAV research and financial impact was now used to identify a “brand bubble,” a theme that was turned into a book and an accompanying website.7 Now the BAV team claimed that there was a bubble in the S&P 500 market capitalization of the magnitude of US$4 trillion twice the size of the subprime mortgage market accounting for about a third of all shareholder value. 

An analysis of 15 years of research data from the BAV survey suggested that relevance and in particular differentiation of the majority of brands had severely deteriorated. The authors claimed that investors had a dramatically inflated view of the value of brands. It assumed that analysts and investors were actually aware of the value of brands and that they were pricing these into their valuations of quoted companies. It may well be that many brands received lower scores in the BAV survey. However, that does not necessarily match with the stock market performance. GE and Starbucks are among the top performers in the BAV matrix but investors have obviously ignored these insights as these stocks lost significant value in the 2008 recession. Zara, on the other hand, performs poorly although the share price of its holding company Inditex Group lost significantly less in the same period. It is not that Starbucks and GE are not strong brands. In fact, they are very valuable brands with GE being among the top ten most valuable brands in published brand surveys. What is uneasy about the BAV analysis is the fact that for many prominent brands the BAV results do not match financial performance and stock market valuations. The overall assumption that stock markets were overvaluing brands for a decade is hard to believe and prove. There is little evidence that analysts and investors are strongly focusing on brand health or value in making investment recommendations or decisions. Although there are examples where analysts will comment on the brands of a specific business they are considering they will be marginal relative to the financial assessment. It is the biggest complaint of most marketers and CMOs that analysts do not pay sufficient, if any, attention to branding and marketing. This is less surprising if one understands on what analytical basis shares are traded. Analysts look at past and in particular expected financial performance of businesses, market dynamics, and valuations as well as macroeconomic trends. The hard core quantitative funds have built sophisticated computer models analyzing nearly all data available to identify predictable patterns for their investment strategies. In this context brand specific data are rare and minor in influence.8 What is mainly impacting stock prices is the financial effect of branding and marketing such as higher revenues, profits, and cash flows. The assumption of BAV’s brand bubble hypothesis is undermined by several key facts. First, brand perceptions are currently peripheral to most analysts’ and investors’ sentiments. It is therefore hard to argue that the changes in the BAV surveys have a significant impact on share prices. There also appears to be a discrepancy between the research data for major brands and the stock market performance of the underlying businesses. The brand bubble hypothesis seems also to ignore the fact that about 70 percent of the leading global brands are older than 50 years. Also, the BAV study, in line with most published brand value surveys, claims that on average, brands account for about one-third of shareholder value. This leaves two-thirds of other intangible and tangible assets. 

The recession that started with the sub-prime crisis in 2007 has affected spending and investments of consumers and businesses and subsequently depressed demand and prices for most goods and services. This will affect brands and their value creation. However, it would be wrong to assume that this will lead to the long-term decline of the economic importance of brands. The dynamics of economic and stock market cycles is much more complex then the BAV hypothesis suggests. The BAV survey provides some interesting insights due to the unique scale and consistency of the research. However, it does not provide clear links to economic value creation as high performance in its main criteria does not necessarily lead to financial value creation. The attempts to overlay financial data have provided some additional insights which are rather broad and reinforce long existing marketing mantras of relevance and differentiation. As such the BAV survey can be used to identify and analyze trends but not to understand and quantify the financial value of brands. 

Another prominent market research approach that tries to assess brand equity is Millward Brown’s BrandZ study. Interestingly, this study is like BAV, sponsored and financed by the WPP Group. Like BAV, BrandZ is a quantitative brand equity study carried out annually since 1998.9 BrandZ interviews consumers about brands from categories in which they shop on a regular basis thereby differentiating it from BAV. Respondents evaluate the brands relative to their competitors. This, the BrandZ team believes, provides more valuable insights because respondents are knowledgeable about the brands and the category they are evaluating. The database of the BrandZ survey is large and comprises of more than 650,000 consumer interviews comparing over 25,000 brands. Through a range of statistical analyses the survey has identified several key evaluation and performance parameters. The core is the BrandDynamics pyramid which was developed by Millward Brown in 1998. The pyramid consists of five hierarchical levels. The bottom level is called presence and represents the familiarity interviewees have with a brand based on past trial, saliency, and knowledge of the brand’s promise. The next level is relevance which assesses whether the brand is relevant to the respondent’s needs, appropriately priced, and is in the consideration set of the respondent. The third level is performance. Here interviewees assess product performance and whether the brand is on their short-list. The next level up is called advantage and relates to the emotional or rational advantage a brand is perceived to have over other brands in the category. The top level of the pyramid is called bonding and refers to rational and emotional attachments to the brand that lead respondents to exclude most of the other brands in the category. Interviewees are assigned to one level of the pyramid according to their responses to a set questionnaire. The higher they are in the pyramid the stronger their relationship with and commitment to the brand. The BrandDynamics pyramid follows established marketing models that assume a hierarchical progression of consumers of a brand from awareness to some form of commitment.

The BrandDynamics pyramid shows the number of respondents that have reached each level. Millward Brown claims to have undertaken additional research to test and verify the relationship between the ranking of respondents on the pyramid and their stated purchase behavior. For each category 400 respondents were selected to complete additional questionnaires about their actual purchases 12 months after the general survey. Millward Brown claim that statistical analyses of these questionnaires support the link between the levels of the pyramids and consumer loyalty. They have developed assessments of the likelihood of consumer purchase and repurchase according to their ranking in the pyramid. According to these analyses purchasing loyalty increases at higher levels of the pyramid. There is also an increase in the proportion of consumer expenditure on that brand, within the category, as respondents ascend the pyramid or as BrandZ calls it a “strong share of wallet.”10

BrandZ have distilled their complex survey into one key performance and benchmark metric called Brand Voltage which measures the growth potential of the brand. Brand Voltage is calculated from the bonding score and claimed purchasing data for the category. A brand with a positive voltage score has potential to increase its share from its own marketing actions and resist the actions of competitors. A brand with a negative voltage has low growth potential and is more vulnerable to the actions of other brands.11

The success of brand valuation and the demand for linking branding to economic value creation prompted Millward Brown in 2006 to produce a brand valuation approach based on the BrandZ study and publish it in response to the BusinessWeek Best Global Brands survey of the top 100 most valuable brands.12 It follows an established three tier analysis which has become the standard of all income based approaches. First, Millward Brown establishes a company’s branded earnings and allocates them to individual brands and countries of operation, based on publicly available financial data from Bloomberg, Datamonitor, and their own research. Second, they determine the portion of branded earnings that are attributable solely to the brand’s equity as measured in the BrandDynamics pyramid. As a third and final step Millward Brown produces a Brand Multiple based on the Brand Momentum analysis. The value of the brand is then a simple calculation: Branded Earnings x Brand Contribution x Brand Multiple. While Millward Brown is more forthcoming in explaining the BrandZ research they are surprisingly opaque about the details of the brand valuation analysis at all levels. 

The brand valuation starts with defining Branded Earnings. While Millward Brown explains that the earnings they use are specific to the brand (i.e. Coca-Cola’s brand earnings exclude earnings from other brands of The Coca-Cola Company such as Fanta, Sprite, etc.) there is no specification regarding the type of earnings that are used for the calculation. From undefined brand earnings “capital charges” are subtracted. Again there is no specification regarding definition and size of capital charges. This lack of definition makes it impossible to understand the basic financial inputs that feed the valuation model. Another issue is the use of a multiples approach. The base number to which the multiplier is applied to is crucial for the valuation. Being so vague about the financial base number provides little comfort for the outcome of the valuation process. The second stage of the valuation is not much clearer. The brand earnings are obviously not what they appear to be as “only a portion of these earnings can be considered being driven by brand equity.”13 So Millward Brown determines through what they call Brand Contribution Analysis the degree to which the brand plays a role in generating earnings or a percentage of the overall brand earnings. The brand contribution then provides the earnings number to which the multiplier is applied to calculate the value of a brand. The brand contribution analysis is established through country-, marketand brand-specific customer research from the BrandZ database. It reflects the share of earnings from a product or service’s most loyal consumers or users. Brand contribution is a metric made available by the BrandZ ranking that quantifies the role of the brand in driving earnings. Brand contribution reflects the share of earnings attributable to the brand alone. This metric is obtained by isolating income that comes from a brand’s most loyal consumers, whose purchase decision is based on brand rather than other factors such as price. Brand contribution is calculated by using research-based consumer loyalty data from the BrandZ database. Brand contribution is presented as an index from one to five where five indicates the strongest brand contribution. It appears that brand contribution is derived from the BrandDynamics pyramid and driven by the two top levels: bonding and advantage. These levels are assumed to represent the most loyal customers with the highest expected “share of wallet.” Although one can follow the assumption that respondents in the top two levels of the pyramid are more likely to be loyal customers of the brand it is not at all clear how this is supposed to relate to the brand versus non-brand factors such as price or other intangible and tangible factors. According to the latest survey from 2009 the IBM and Pepsi-Cola brands contribute the same percentage of branded earnings as both have a contribution index of 3. It easy to understand that, in the case of IBM, factors other than the brand drive the company’s earnings – customer service, expertise, and global execution capabilities are factors that can be seen as less or little brand dependent. However, in the case of Pepsi-Cola it is much more difficult to follow the same logic as there is little else than the brand that drives the underlying business.With the exception of some trade promotions Pepsi is not sold at a discount compared to competing drinks products in most markets. The Pepsi brand is thus the most dominant driver of consumer choice. The analyses that have led to the brand contribution framework are not sufficiently disclosed but the comparison of the IBM and Pepsi brands demonstrate that the logic is flawed. 

The final stage of the valuation process also lacks transparency. The earnings purely attributable to the brand are multiplied with a brand multiple “based on market valuations, brand growth potential and Voltage as measured by BrandDynamics.”14 Millward Brown project the brand value forward based on market valuations, the brand’s risk profile, and its growth potential. Data for this step is sourced from the BrandZ database, Bloomberg, and the company’s own research. Based on these inputs Millward Brown produces the brand momentum index. It is an index of a brand’s short-term growth rate (1 year) relative to the average short-term growth rate of all brands in the BrandZ ranking. The brand momentum index ranges between one and 10 where 10 indicates brands with highest short-term growth potential. Brand momentum is based on three inputs: Its likelihood to gain market share and increase value; expected growth in the sector the brand operates in; and overall growth potential in a particular country and category. A brand’s growth potential also depends on its current market share and awareness rates. Obviously, assessing the brand multiple is quite involved. This is fair, given its importance in determining brand values. However, no attempt is made to clarify how brand voltage, brand momentum, short term growth rates as well as all the other inputs are weighted and combined to provide the brand multiple. The results can be surprising. According to the 2009 survey, the Coca-Cola and Marlboro brands have a brand momentum of eight and nine respectively despite operating in mature and in many markets declining categories. On the other hand, Google and Intel have a brand momentum of three and two respectively despite operating in much more dynamic technology markets. Since the values are supposed to represent future cash flows this appears to be at adds with overall market and industry trends. Such results provide little confidence in the multiples that are derived from the brand momentum analysis.15

From a pure market research point of view, the BrandZ study provides interesting insights due to the depth of the research data. It also delivers some brand equity analyses that are useful knowledge when accessing brands. As such, it has a similar value to other brand equity research studies based on large-scale consumer research like BAV. However, similar to BAV, the results of the survey do not translate easily into a valuation approach that can assess and create understanding of the economic value of brands. The whole process lacks transparency at all stages of the valuation. Both financial and marketing inputs are unclear and misleading. Brand earnings, brand contribution, and brand multiple are insufficiently defined and explained. Despite its extensive research and data sources the BrandZ survey does not result in a convincing valuation approach. The results reflect this perfectly. In its method description Millward Brown claim that the BrandZ valuations differ positively from the high volatility of financial markets and that their “intrinsic approach” reflects the “true value rather than current market swings.” However, the survey results contradict this claim as difference in year on year change of brand value ranges from value growth of 168 percent (China Merchant Bank) to a value decline of 53 percent (Bank of America). In the 2008 survey the spread was even larger ranging from a 390 percent increase of the value of the BlackBerry brand to a decline of 30 percent of the Motorola brand. Even the value of a mature and established brand such as AT&T can increase within one year by 67 percent.16 This volatility in brand values seems in opposition to the established business wisdom that strong and powerful brands provide higher stability and predictability of cash flows. There is no question that substantial data and analyses lie behind the BrandZ survey. This however, does not translate into a credible model or approach for understanding, identifying, and assessing the value of brands. Neither the model nor the results are convincing. However, as mentioned previously, the sheer size of the survey provides some interesting insights and these need to be considered and assessed in isolation. The survey does not produce financial values that are useful and meaningful for either the marketing or financial communities. It poses more questions than it answers. As such the approach lacks credibility and confidence with respect to method and results. 

The Nielsen company has also developed brand equity models that claim to link to economic value creation. The research company developed, in cooperation with Kevin Keller from the Tuck School of Business, a brand equity index based on research on more than 2,400 brands. The brand equity score is calculated based on interviewees’ response to questions regarding favorability, recommendation, and willingness to pay a premium price. The index scores range from one to 10, the latter represents the maximum score attainable. The approach is relatively simple and contains the main brand equity components. The company claims that it can link the results to consumer loyalty, but it does not provide an explicit link to financial results. Nielsen has also tried to stretch its brand equity thinking to brand valuation. Its model assesses the economic value of a brand based on sales data. The annual sales of a brand are multiplied with a brand strength factor expressed as a percentage. Brand strength is assessed according to four core indicators. 

These indicators are given different weighting totaling 100 percent. The first, market attractiveness, has a weighting of 15 percent. This indicator assesses the attractiveness of the market in which the brand operates according to volume and growth prospects. The second indicator is the brand’s acceptance within the market with a weighting of 35 percent. This indicator looks at how the brand performs in its market, its existing market share, and share growth in value terms. The third indicator is consumer acceptance which has the highest weighting of 40 percent. Consumer acceptance is measured through brand awareness and brand consideration. The fourth indicator is distribution with a weighting of 10 percent. It measures the distribution coverage and availability of the brand. The derived percentage is applied to normalized annual revenues of the brand. The result is called the brand strength profit. It is multiplied with a discount factor representing average market return to calculate the value of the brand. This calculation assumes an unlimited life span of the brand as well as a constant sales return.17

The Nielsen approach is relatively simple and can be executed with a data set that is easily available in most companies. It is, however, overly simplistic and lacks some key elements. The financial assumptions are probably the hardest to accept. Using a brand strength assessment to derive the profitability of a brand does not fit with any established financial principles and is therefore an assumption that would require substantial validation. It is not an assumption that any financially literate person would find easily acceptable. The approach does not differentiate between the brand and other business assets. The assumption must be that the brand strength profit represents the financial return of the brand and everything else refers to other costs and returns from other business assets. This is a questionable assumption. The simplistic forecasting is out of line with common financial practice. The brand strength indicators are basic but include some of the important metrics such as market share, awareness, consideration, and distribution. How they are derived and weighted is unclear and therefore hard to assess. The financial approach is questionable and there is no causal link between marketing and finance. Overall, the Nielsen approach is not suitable to assess the economic value of brands. 

The Ipsos Group has also developed a brand equity approach based on their research experience and capabilities. Their “measure of brand equity uses a handful of standardized attitude measures that are generalizable across brands, business sectors, and markets. These measures have been derived from a comprehensive study of 200 different brands from 40 different product and service categories, comprising over 12,000 consumer interviews for over 200,000 individual brand assessments.”18 Ipsos’ brand equity model is called “Brand Health” and is built on three main factors: Brand equity perceptions; consumer involvement with the category; and price/value perceptions. These measures are derived based on a series of standard rating scales. 

Each factor is composed of several dimensions. Brand equity perceptions comprise familiarity, uniqueness, relevance, popularity, and quality. Involvement reflects consumers’ reported sensitivity to differences between brands, how much they matter in their specific category, and how easily they can be substituted. Price represents the perceived price/value relationship. The three factors have been correlated with a brand health assessment comprising reported brand loyalty, commitment, purchase intent ratings, and price sensitivity as well as market share and to 5-year trends in share and profitability. Ipsos also ran a survey to develop understanding and identification of the drivers of brand equity. By far the most important driver of brand equity was product performance. The following factors were packaging, visual identity (logo, feel, artwork), and brand name. Each of them had a similar impact. Advertising was the fifth most important factor but had a relatively minor impact. The Ipsos model comprises the key elements found in most of the sophisticated brand equity models. However, the driver analysis shows some limitations as, for example, product performance is difficult to measure for many packaged goods, products such as soft drinks and snacks. The other brand equity drivers are very closely interrelated and hard to separate. Brand name, visual identity, and packaging have a very similar correlation which may indicate that they have been perceived as communicating the same message as they all visually represent the brand. In the case of packaged goods, the product’s name, logo, and packaging will all identify the brand and its message. The driver analysis appears therefore limited. Overall, the Ipsos model covers the main components of brand equity but does not link into financial value creation. As such, it is not suitable for assessing the economic value of brands.19

Another variation of the research-based brand equity approach has been developed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). The core concept is the price premium that consumers are willing to pay over and above the lowest cost also known as the “willingness to pay” (WTP). PwC regard this metric as the ultimate value assessment for brands. It rests on the established research technique called conjoint or “trade-off” analysis which is employed in product development and pricing research. Consumers choose between different options of offers and price levels. The result is the preference to pay relatively more than the cheapest offer in the set. This PwC believes represents an expression of consumer preference and thus a trusted economic measure. The approach is limited by its focus on price premium and the lack of a resulting economic or financial value. According to the WTP logic, the higher the price premium consumers are willing to pay the higher the absolute value. However, price differentials in a category can easily blur and the difference in options may be marginal. There is also the behavioral impact of increasing price and declining relevance. An optimal price is not necessarily the highest chargeable price but the balance between price and volume. Also conjoint studies tend to work best for direct material differences but much less or not at all for soft image aspects and other variables that influence the purchase but are harder to imagine for interviewees in a research situation. The comparison of the options tends to be driven by the hard tangible aspects such as price and product functions. In the case of a car this could be engine size, warranties, and extras such as leather seats and alloy wheels. However, it is harder to add softer and emotional aspects into the options such as cool, stylish, or safe. In addition, aspects such as dealer network, point of sale influence by the sales representative are other aspects that are difficult to include in such an approach. Therefore, these studies work with a limited set of tangible or hard attributes neglecting the softer elements of consumer choice. They underestimate the impact of emotional factors which are fundamental in understanding the value creation of brands. In addition, WTP provides a preference metric but not a financial value for the brand.20

A rather simple and easily understandable brand equity measurement is the net promoter score introduced by Frederick Reichheld from Bain & Co.21 Companies obtain their Net Promoter Score by registering customers’ responses to a single question on a 0–10 rating scale. For example, “How likely is it that you would recommend our company to a friend or colleague?” Based on their responses, customers can be categorized into one of three groups: promoters (9–10 rating); passives (7–8 rating); and detractors (0–6 rating). The percentage of detractors is then subtracted from the percentage of promoters to obtain a Net Promoter score. A score of 75 percent or above is considered quite high. Although the approach follows familiar and established customer satisfaction surveys it became popular due to its simplicity. Beyond the publicity the approach does not offer much more than traditional customer satisfaction surveys as respondents are likely to answer satisfaction and recommendation in a similar fashion. Many satisfaction surveys use several questions including satisfaction and recommendation statements to avoid survey dependence on the result of one question. The main and obvious limitation of the net promoter approach is the lack of insights and identification of causal relationships which seriously limits its use. It provides little insight into what drives the financial performance of a business or of what contributes to the Net Promoter score. It may be correlated with some latent construct of brand equity but, in the end, the only reasonable interpretation is to take the measure at face value. It is simply the stated likelihood that the survey respondent will recommend your brand to others. As such it is a very basic tracking device. It is unsuitable for assessing brand equity and the economic value of brands as it does not link directly into either. 

The main achievement of brand equity has been to distill and develop, out of the data pool of market research, economically relevant concepts and metrics. They have helped to provide structure and economic logic to the marketing view of the value creation of brands in particular with respect to purchase intent and behavior as well as loyalty. However, the logic of many equity models rests on proprietary research and insights which are not disclosed. Without understanding and verification of the underlying research and assumptions made, many of these models are difficult to understand and follow. Although there is a positive claim as to the depth of data, the scope of surveys, and the statistical analyses, there is a lack of disclosure around the assumptions that make these models work. This is not surprising as most agencies want to exploit their models commercially to sell their clients market research programs. Many of these models are also based on established market research surveys which had to be statistically reengineered to provide a model fit with some statistical relevance. Traditionally, the focus of most market research has been on assessing the impact of media communications which limits the overall point of view on the value creation of brands. In general, most models fall victim to having to balance too many variables, established questionnaire designs, and research methods into a statistically cohesive model. While the resulting models may produce statistically relevant results they are limited by the data input. The acknowledgement of one of the models, that only 25 percent of market value was supposedly explained by brand factors from market research studies and 55 percent from financial data, shows the lack of linkage between the research-based brand equity models and relevant financial outcomes. The lack of integrating financial and marketing analyses, therefore, produces limited results. 

Brand equity models have added a long-term view on brand value as a balance to short-term sales impacts of marketing initiatives. As such, they have provided crucial building blocks for the economic assessment of brands. However, all brand equity models grapple with their ambition to explain economic and ultimately financial outcomes. The financial term “equity” is used to demonstrate the economic relevance of the different research approaches. They are, therefore, in a difficult position as they imply that they can explain economic outcomes but do not follow through with a credible financial model. Many equity models have completed some type of share price or profitability correlation to claim the validity of their approaches. These, however, tend to be limited by the time periods they cover and are not integrated parts of the models but add on justifications. Those equity models that have integrated a financial module into their approach have so far not delivered convincing results. The joint venture between Y&R’s BAV and Stern Stewart lasted only a couple of years and the BrandZ’s financial output is confused and difficult to reconcile. There is a clear imbalance between the sophistication that goes into the market research modules and the simplicity of the financial analyses. Within these models the financial analysis is not a core component of the approach but an addon designed to sell marketing to financially focused audiences. This is reflected in the quality of the brand valuation approaches and results. The brand equity models provide the marketing data and metrics that are necessary to understand and assess the economic value of brands. They are, however, only one side of the equation. A matching financial analysis is required to provide a comprehensive brand valuation approach. 


NOTES
  1. David Aaker, 1996a.
  2. David Aaker, 1996a, p. 336.
  3. Kevin Lane Keller, 2009.
  4. see brandassetconsulting.com
  5. BAV Electronics 2006.
  6. Jonathan Knowles, 2003.
  7. John Gerzeman and Ed Lebar, 2008; thebrandbubble.com
  8. Deboo, 2007.
  9. See brandz.com
  10. See brandz.com
  11. See brandz.com
  12. See brandz.com; Financial Times, 2009.
  13. FT Global Brands, 2009, p. 2.
  14. David Muir, 2009, p. 2.
  15. See Financial Times, 2009.
  16. See Millward Brown, 2008.
  17. See The Neilsen Company.
  18. See http://www.ipsos-asi.com/pdf/rc5.pdf
  19. Dave Walker, 2002.
  20. See PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008.
  21. See Frederick F. Reichheld, 2003; bain.com


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